In overturning the criminal conviction of former Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell, the Supreme Court has taken a distressingly narrow view of what constitutes political corruption. ADVERTISING In overturning the criminal conviction of former Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell, the Supreme Court
In overturning the criminal conviction of former Virginia Gov. Bob McDonnell, the Supreme Court has taken a distressingly narrow view of what constitutes political corruption.
McDonnell, a Republican, opened the doors of state government wide to Jonnie R. Williams Sr., a businessman who admitted he lavished gifts and loans on the governor and his family in hopes of obtaining state support for Anatabloc, a tobacco-based nutritional supplement developed by his company. The largess, whose total value exceeded $175,000, included a $6,500 Rolex watch for McDonnell and $15,000 in catering expenses for his daughter’s wedding.
For his part, McDonnell sought to arrange meetings for Williams with state officials and hosted a luncheon event for Williams’ company at the governor’s mansion — essentially a state-sponsored infomercial.
The governor also talked up the advantages of Anatabloc at a meeting called to discuss the state’s health plan for its employees.
Prosecutors convinced a jury that, in exchange for financial support from Williams, McDonnell had taken “official acts” to benefit the businessman. But, speaking for a unanimous court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. disagreed.
“Setting up a meeting, talking to another official, or organizing an event (or agreeing to do so) — without more — does not fit (the) definition of ‘official act,’” Roberts wrote. In the court’s view, such acts “must involve a formal exercise of governmental power.”
That reading is far too forgiving. It’s true McDonnell didn’t sign a bill or issue an executive order helping Williams’ business. But can there be any doubt the governor hoped state employees would be influenced by his efforts on Williams’ behalf? That they didn’t succumb is not the point.
Roberts worried that accepting the definition of “official acts” presented to the jury might criminalize the routine business of government. He noted that “conscientious public officials arrange meetings for constituents, contact other officials on their behalf and include them in events all the time.”
But most of the time, those conscientious public officials haven’t taken hundreds of thousands of dollars for their own personal use.
Even the chief justice conceded the facts in this case weren’t typical. So why not trust a jury to distinguish between innocuous interventions on behalf of constituents and a sustained and self-interested effort by a governor to assist a man who had helped him financially?
We agree with the court that overzealous prosecutors sometimes stretch the language of criminal statutes. But this wasn’t such a case. Jonnie Williams was not your average constituent, and Bob McDonnell provided much more than routine constituent services.
The Supreme Court should have let the jury’s judgment stand.
— Los Angeles Times