Since January 2022, the National Archives’ and FBI’s recovery from a Florida resort of 300 classified documents — reportedly including CIA, NSA, and FBI products — has fueled public conversation about the proper handling and declassification of state secrets. This is understandable. Most people (including most government employees and military veterans) have not worked in, or have had minimal exposure to, the classified world and are left grasping at meaning while jargon like “TS/SCI” and “SAPs” and “Q clearance” is bandied about by newscasters and congresspeople who also lack firsthand experience.
So, let’s peek behind the curtain and equip you to understand the issue more like a cleared spook.
The three basic tiers of classification — Confidential, Secret and Top Secret — are applied to information and technology based on the level of damage to national security that would occur if they were divulged to an adversary. Damage can include executed human sources, compromised billion-dollar technical collection platforms (think satellites), exposed vulnerabilities of advanced weapons systems, divulged intelligence estimates on foreign leaders, exposed diplomatic negotiation positions, or tipped off covert counterproliferation operations.
Beyond Top Secret, additional restrictions for the most sensitive of information further narrows the list of people who are “read in” (granted access). These “compartments” include the Special Access Programs (SAPs) mentioned in the news, and “Sensitive Compartmented Information” (SCI) is one related label. (Conversely, there are restrictions on information that, while privileged, falls short of requiring classification, such as Sensitive Security Information, Law Enforcement Sensitive and For Official Use Only.)
Storage, transport, and transmission requirements for classified material are increasingly onerous the higher the classification and involve a world of specialty safes, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs), secure email systems and encrypted faxes, and other access controls not found outside of the intelligence community. Indeed, some of the most sensitive information is only disseminated by hand in hardcopy to very few recipients; copies are retrieved and destroyed after being read.
(Once you understand that all classified is not created equal, in terms of handling requirements and potential damage from exposure, it is easier to see pukas in arguments comparing the Mar-a-Lago trove to a former Cabinet member’s inappropriate storage on a private server of emails containing discussions of the content of classified documents, not the documents themselves. Both are irresponsible, but in the event of compromise, there are exponentially different levels of potential damage, especially considering reports of the presence in Florida of nuclear weapons secrets requiring the highly restricted Department of Energy Q clearance to read.)
Speaking of clearances, access to classified information and technology is based on the “need to know” principle, and one’s need to know is determined by their official duties. The extent of vetting conducted on a person to be “cleared” for access depends on the level of classification of the information with which they need to work — from a relatively simple background check to a yearlong background investigation with a counterintelligence polygraph (and regular follow up).
Declassification occurs when there is a requirement to further disseminate information (e.g., the current administration’s unprecedented release to the public of intelligence about Russian plans for invasion and “false flag” operations just before the Ukraine conflict erupted). Responsible declassification is a multiparty process, heavily dependent on the input of the agency that generated the classified material, to assess the potential damage to national security interests (sources and methods, for instance) that could result from removing protections. It is not a frequent or simple process.
“What about penalties for negligence?” In my two-decade career, I witnessed write-ups and reprimands, loss of access, and even a contract termination for accidental violations. Deliberate violations were the stuff of law enforcement action and separation, like CIA Director David Petraeus’ situation in 2012. Under a president-initiated clampdown on leaks of classified information, I was twice interviewed by FBI agents aiming to plug holes during the Obama administration. In 2018, then President Trump went further, elevating the wrongful moving of classified information from a misdemeanor to a felony and increasing possible incarceration from one year to five.
Only time will tell if the stricter penalties will apply in the ongoing case. Stay tuned.
J.P. Atwell is a former senior CIA operations officer. His two-decade career began as an intelligence analyst and took him to every continent, save Antarctica. He now calls Hawaii Island home. He welcomes your comments at island.intelligencer@gmail.com.