Boeing, not Spirit, mis-installed piece that blew off Alaska Max 9 jet, industry source says
The fuselage panel that blew off an Alaska Airlines jet earlier this month was removed for repair then reinstalled improperly by Boeing mechanics on the Renton, Washington, final assembly line, a person familiar with the details of the work told The Seattle Times.
If verified by the National Transportation Safety Board investigation, this would leave Boeing primarily at fault for the accident, rather than its supplier Spirit AeroSystems, which originally installed the panel into the 737 Max 9 fuselage in Wichita, Kansas.
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That panel, a door plug used to seal a hole in the fuselage sometimes used to accommodate an emergency exit, blew out of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 as it climbed out of Portland on Jan. 5. The hair-raising incident drew fresh and sharp criticism of Boeing’s quality control systems and safety culture, which has been under the microscope since two fatal 737 Max crashes five years ago.
Last week, an anonymous whistleblower — who appears to have access to Boeing’s manufacturing records of the work done assembling the specific Alaska Airlines jet that suffered the blowout — on an aviation website separately provided many additional details about how the door plug came to be removed and then mis-installed.
“The reason the door blew off is stated in black and white in Boeing’s own records,” the whistleblower wrote. “It is also very, very stupid and speaks volumes about the quality culture at certain portions of the business.”
The self-described Boeing insider said company records show four bolts that prevent the door plug from sliding up off the door frame stop pads that take the pressurization loads in flight, “were not installed when Boeing delivered the airplane.” the whistleblower stated. “Our own records reflect this.”
NTSB investigators already publicly raised the possibility that the bolts had not been installed.
The account goes on to describe shocking lapses in Boeing’s quality control process in Renton.
The work of the mechanics on the door plug should have been formally inspected and signed off by a Boeing quality inspector.
It wasn’t, the whistleblower wrote, because of a process failure and the use of two separate systems to record what work was accomplished.
Boeing’s 737 production system is described as “a rambling, shambling, disaster waiting to happen.”
If that account of what happened is indeed fully documented in Boeing’s system it should be readily verified by the investigation.
The Seattle Times offered Boeing the opportunity to dispute the details in this story. Citing the ongoing investigation, Boeing declined to comment. Likewise, so did Spirit, the FAA, the Machinists union and the NTSB.
The whistleblower outlines how, because of a mistake, the removal and re-installation of the door plug in Renton was never entered in the computer system where every detail of the build process on each individual aircraft is recorded. As a result, no quality inspection was triggered.
Ed Pierson, a former manager of the Max production line and himself a whistleblower who raised concerns about quality control in Renton before the first Max crash in Indonesia in 2018, said in an interview Monday the new account of the door plug mis-installation and the error in the recording of the work “is very consistent with what I saw in the factory personally.”